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MILITARY UNIONS

THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES  
OF UNIONIZATION WITHIN  
THE ARMED FORCES

by

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Two military unions operating with some degree of success in West Germany and Norway, respectively, are analyzed. A description of the background, historical development, and functions of each union is provided, along with a discussion of the limitations placed upon the operations of each union by their respective governments. From this background data, an examination is made of the advantages and disadvantages of a military union to military members and military managers. Five limitations that are common to both the Norwegian and West German unions are discussed to determine their applicability to the armed forces of the United States -- should unionization of our military services occur.

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### Biographical Data

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## Abstract

Military unionization is often viewed with apprehension by the leaders of both our national government and the military establishment. Nevertheless, the possibility exists that a labor union within the military services of the United States could well become a reality with the advent of an all-volunteer armed force. Although the actual likelihood or degree of probability of such an event is indeterminant at this time, the situation should be closely studied to determine the advantages and disadvantages of military unionization and the possible limitations that need be imposed on a military union should it become a reality. Such is the purpose of this study.

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## I. INTRODUCTION

Military unionization is oftentimes viewed with apprehension and alarm by the leaders of our national government and the military establishment. The very idea of a military union is sometimes thought of as treasonable. Nevertheless, the fact exists that a labor union within the United States military services could well become a reality with the advent of an all-volunteer armed force. Although the actual likelihood or degree of probability of such an event is indeterminate at this time, the situation should be closely studied to determine the advantages and disadvantages of military unionization and the possible limitations that need be imposed on military unions should they become a reality. Such is the purpose of this study.

### Overview

The history of unionism within the United States can be traced back to pre-Revolutionary times, when the printers, cobblers, and carpenters organized to form local craft unions and benevolent societies. Although these early groups did not have the characteristics of modern labor unions, they did bring the workers together to devise solutions to mutual problems. These craft unions were primarily local in nature and did not have the support of all members of the trade. Nevertheless, growth at the local level continued to progress until an effort was made, in 1834, to federate local unions into a national trade union organization.<sup>1</sup>

Union growth in the public sector of the economy has been of more recent origin. Unions of public employees were first organized in the postal services in the 1890's and were recognized by Congress in 1912.<sup>2</sup> Other public employees -- such as teachers, firemen, and federal clerical employees -- have also established national employee organizations. However, the overall growth of unionism among federal government workers has been relatively slow when compared with the private sector. Perhaps this is because of a lesser recognized need for collective bargaining, since many typical areas of negotiation such as hours and wages are provided for by legislation.

The enactment of the Wagner Act in 1935 firmly established collective bargaining in the private sector, as we know it today.<sup>3</sup> But the Wagner Act was primarily concerned with the rights of employees in the private sector of the economy, and very little has been done to establish similar benefits for public employees. Indeed, an article in a relatively recent issue of the Air Force Judge Advocate General Law Review argued that the rights enjoyed by private employees are simply not applicable to public employees.<sup>4</sup>

Since the primary basis of any government is permanence and continuity, then it would seem that the right to strike must be withheld from government employees. Such restriction, of course, would preclude this group from bargaining effectively through the threat of withholding their work or services. Furthermore, in organizing government employees, the line is usually drawn at

the military. Not only is chain-of-command discipline essential to the functioning of the military, but to allow its members the right to strike would most certainly endanger the national security.

Despite these considerations, ample precedents for the unionization of military personnel have been established in other nations. Labor organization of military personnel has occurred in West Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Austria.<sup>5</sup> On the other hand, an attempt toward unionization by the Transport and General Workers Union in Great Britain was turned down by the Minister of Defense in November 1969.<sup>6</sup> A similar attempt at organizing the Canadian Armed Forces and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police was thwarted by the Canadian Government in late 1970.<sup>7</sup>

The attempts toward military unionization within the United States have been relatively minimal and rather less than a success, as evidenced by a futile organization attempt at Fort Sill, Oklahoma in 1968.<sup>8</sup> It must be pointed out that an established union did not originate the plan; rather it was attempted by twenty young enlisted men. Organized labor showed no interest at all. The AFL-CIO felt that no employer-employee relationship existed.<sup>9</sup> In contrast to viable European military unions, some groups of U.S. servicemen have banded together to demand things additional to improvements in hours, wages, and other terms of employment. As an example, demands included the right to refuse an illegal order, and the abolition of the salute and the election of officers.<sup>10</sup> The servicemen were also against wars.<sup>11</sup> With these



militarily unrealistic demands, it is little wonder that the unionization attempts were futile. Possibly with more realistic demands, these groups might have met with more success as have many unions in the public sector.

Even though attempts toward military unionization have been rejected in Canada, England, and the United States, the existence of military unions in Norway, West Germany, and other Western nations clearly illustrates that unionization of the military is entirely possible. The possibility seems even stronger if a co-existence is established that is based upon reasonable and limited demands that would not lessen military discipline or weaken national security.

### Research Questions

With the fact that unions have already been established within the armed forces of several leading nations of the world and with the possibility that the establishment of similar unions within our own military services may be an ultimate consequence of an all-volunteer force, the objective of this study was to address the following research questions:

1. What would be the advantages and disadvantages of a military labor union to a military member?<sup>12</sup>
2. What would be the advantages and disadvantages of a military labor union to a military manager?<sup>13</sup>
3. What limitations should be imposed upon a military union?

## Research Methodology

The basic approach of this study was to accumulate background information on the history of military unions in other countries where they presently exist in order to analyze the applicability of such information to unionization within our own armed forces. Norway and West Germany were selected for study, primarily because officers of the military forces of these two nations were relatively convenient for interview as sources of information.

Periodical literature published from 1966 through 1971 was used as the primary data source for information needed in the study. It was necessary to rely upon periodicals as the prime source of information, since no books were found to relate to the subject investigated. Furthermore, the use of magazine and newspaper articles also, undoubtedly, provided a more current view on military affairs in Norway, Germany, and the United States during the period of this research.

Another source of information was the printed literature from the countries concerned. A number of informative articles were invaluable to the description of historical development and the present status of the foreign labor organizations.

Subsequent to the review of foreign source literature, unstructured interviews with both Norwegian and German officers provided further insight in regard to their unions that could not be discerned from a literature review. These interviews illuminated the personal



feelings of officers who were both members and non-members of their respective country's military unions.

#### Categorization of Data

Four categories were established to classify the information gathered for this study. Into the first category was placed all information providing background data that could be considered historical in nature. The second category encompassed current descriptive data, such as what was occurring in the 1966 to 1971 time frames within the respective unions. The third category included information relating to the effectiveness of a military union in its ability to bargain for the members. The information collected into the second and third categories was used to describe the advantages and disadvantages of existing military unions in order to determine what benefits and problems the U.S. armed forces might face should military unionization occur in these establishments. The fourth category was used to collect information relating to the limitations on the existing unions, in order to determine what limitations should be placed upon our own military unions should they become a reality.

#### Applicability to Research Questions

The application of the information collected within these categories was used to address the research questions raised by the study.

What would be the advantages and disadvantages of a military labor union to military members and military

managers? This question, a combination of Research Questions One and Two, was addressed by describing the background of military unions in Norway and Germany and by discussing their purposes and what they have attempted to accomplish for the military community in their respective countries. These descriptive analyses are presented in Parts II and III of this paper.

Part IV addresses the questions of advantages and disadvantages of a military union to both its members and managers -- but from the viewpoint of the organization existing in the United States military forces rather than those of European nations.

What limitations should be placed upon military unions? This question is addressed in Part V of the study by reviewing limitations the Norwegian and German unions have placed upon their own organizations, and then drawing conclusions as to what limitations should be imposed upon a labor organization within the United States armed forces.

Part VI includes a restatement of the findings from the study and a presentation of conclusions and recommendations made.

## **II. NORWEGIAN UNIONIZATION**

Union development within the armed forces of Norway has evolved as a natural phenomenon of their society and form of government. As early as 1899, the National Federation of Trades Unions was founded as a central organization for artisans. A year later, in 1900, the Norwegian Employers' Confederation was formed as an employers organization to bargain with the unions.<sup>14</sup> Further, Norway was governed by a Labor Party from 1935, when the party came into power, until 1965, at which time a coalition government was restored.<sup>15</sup> During the three-decade period of Labor Party control, many labor-oriented laws were enacted. Consequently, the country is highly unionized.

In Norway, as in many other industrial nations, the only effective way that a group of employees may bring their problems to the attention of the government is through union organization and representation. In a highly unionized nation such as Norway, the need for an organization to represent the government employees and members of the armed forces was quite apparent. Thus, the Norwegian armed forces and the national police joined together to form a non-political union, BEFALETS FELLES ORGANISASJON (B.F.O.), an organization which bargains for wages, hours, promotion, housing, retirement, and other social benefits for its members.<sup>16</sup>

The B.F.O. has grown into a fully mature union which has achieved success in establishing a cooperative relationship with the Norwegian government.

### Development of the B.F.O.

After the termination of the Second World War, many officers and non-commissioned officers in the Norwegian Defense Forces realized the need for a unifying organization. In Norway, the term "Defense Forces" is collective and encompasses all three service branches -- the Norwegian Army, Navy, and Air Force. The necessity of cooperation and coordination of the group as a unit was required to accomplish representation to the union sector of the nation. Until this time, the officers of the separate services had been loosely organized into individual "social" clubs that were bound together through a bond of common interest, military background, and education. Many officers wanted to avoid disagreement among these different groups and consequently advocated the establishment of one unifying organization.<sup>17</sup>

The need for organization was also recognized by the leaders of the Norwegian Defense Forces. In October 1946, the Minister of Defense wrote a letter to all officers' associations wherein he expressed the following opinion:

During my work in DOD and during travel in the countryside, I have an impression that all officers within the Norwegian Defense System are missing a common organization that can represent the common interest of officers towards DOD and government officials everywhere, and also through which the DOD and government officials on their side can consult on matters of officers wages and working conditions.<sup>18</sup>

With support such as that expressed by the Defense Minister for the establishment of a common organization to represent the military officers, the stage was set for many years of effort that would be directed toward military unionization. More than a decade would pass, however, before success was ultimately achieved.

During 1946 and 1947, the leaders of the different military organizations held several meetings whose objectives were to coordinate their negotiable demands and establish greater cooperation among themselves. As a result, an Officers Association Common Board was formed in 1947. The organization consisted of all the officers' associations within the Norwegian Armed Forces with but one exception, the Norges Befalslag. An older organization of non-commissioned officers, the Norges Befalslag did not desire to join the newly formed Officers Association Common Board.<sup>19</sup> Unfortunately, this initial attempt to organize the various military associations into one unified group was not successful. The various service organizations were quite stratified, with lower ranking officers not being invited to join together with the field grade or executive level officers.

In 1947 the Army appointed a team of representatives from different organizations within their own service to examine the possibility of bringing together the diverse Army associations. An "Army Officers Association" was recommended by the team, but nothing more developed from their investigations. Again, in 1952, another attempt toward unification of the associations was made without success.

During the seven years from 1947 until 1954, the Officers Association Common Board had been ineffectual in its efforts to bring together the scattered military associations. In 1954 the board agreed to work with Norges Befalslag in appointing a team whose sole purpose would be to study the establishment of a common organization. Finally, in January 1955, a proposal was worked out that was to be the beginning of the B.F.O. An interim board was subsequently established with the main objective being to form one association for all commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers within the Norwegian Defense Forces. The board consolidated thoughts and plans to insure the interests of all the members would be covered when the new union was formed and supporting laws were passed.

With the Navy and Air Force fully supporting the objectives and plans of the board, the many years of frustration in seeking unification were almost over. The formal founding of the Befalets Felles Organization occurred on 11 September 1957. A single organization that included all branches of the services became a reality.

B.F.O.'s principal objective was to serve its members' interests while remaining politically neutral and working for an understanding of the defense establishment among the Norwegian people.

Although success had finally been achieved in establishing a military union or association, only 5,000 officers and NCO's joined the organization even though 16,000 were eligible for membership within the Norwegian armed forces. However, in July 1958, the Official Service Agreement was enacted into law, which required



mandatory union membership for the military. Since then, the B.F.O. has grown into a fully mature and representative union.

#### Functions of the Organization

A unique way of determining military pay is used in Norway -- at least unique in terms of the United States military point of view. Throughout Norway, almost all trade unions negotiate with the National Price Board for the pay scales of their union members. The wages are normally set in a two or three year contract, with the Defense Force having a two year wage contract. Thus, without the aid of the B.F.O., military personnel would have no representation before the National Price Board and, therefore, no way to negotiate for their wages.

The B.F.O. is also performing several other functions related to wages of their military members. The union has negotiated an overtime limitation with the government. Military personnel may not work more than ten hours per week overtime or more than 105 hours per year overtime without union approval. Exceptions are made during catastrophies or national emergencies. Negotiations are also under way to provide additional pay for duty performed on Sunday.

The B.F.O. also serves as an information center in that current information about new laws that are beneficial to its members are published and distributed through seven union periodicals. Typical news items explain new eligibility rules for housing, how to build

a home, how to rent a house, and what a rental contract is. The B.F.O. has also made available publications explaining rules for borrowing money, to include sources, procedures, interest rates, and liability. Through these efforts of publishing relevant information, the B.F.O. strives to serve the welfare of its members.

### Union Limitations

The limitations placed upon the union are logically derived from the B.F.O.'s stated objective of being politically neutral, serving its members interests, and working for an understanding of the Defense Forces among the Norwegian people. The limitations of operation have apparently not diluted the union's ability to function effectively and to serve the needs of its members.

The following is a listing of militarily important constraints that have been placed upon the union:

1. The union will not strike. Without a doubt in the mind of the military leader, this is a fundamental limitation to be placed upon any military union. The obvious reason that the right to strike must be withheld is that the security of the nation must not be jeopardized.

2. The union may not interfere with military law. Crimes against the nation's Defense System in either peace or war will be tried by and governed by the military courts. The laws of the military must reign supreme in discharging military justice, and no redress may be made through the union.

3. The union has no control in battle. In the event of national emergencies or war, the union is not able to represent its members. No grievances may be filed, and no limitation may be imposed on hours of duty or overtime. Commanders are free to defend the homeland with all resources at their command.

4. The union will not interfere with the military mission. This is a rather broad restriction, but it applies widely to the acceptance of orders. As an example, if an order is received by an individual who feels the order is illegal, his first duty is to obey the order. Afterwards, the recipient of the order may file a grievance with the union. Illegal orders under conflict are treated by military law or civil law, thus providing flexibility and protection to the members.

5. The union is basically limited to collective bargaining for social benefits of its members. This restriction reflects the entire purpose of Befaltes Felles Organisasjon, which is to strive for betterment of the military through direct representation with the government. Within this framework, the B.F.O. performs its functions in serving the welfare of its members.

### Summary

Within a country that is so highly unionized as is Norway, the formation of a military union would seem inevitable. With the impetus created by the Minister of Defense in suggesting the need for a common organization, work was begun in that direction. After eleven years, organization was complete and the union became a

reality. The primary objective of the union was to bargain with the government in the interest of their members, while maintaining political neutrality and fostering an understanding of defense among the public. The excellent cooperation between the B.F.O. and the military indicates that unionization within the Norwegian Defense Forces is a success.

### III. GERMAN UNIONIZATION

The West German combined armed forces, known as the Bundeswehr, are partially unionized by the Public service, Transport and Traffic Workers Union (O.T.V.), which concentrates upon the organization of career officers and non-commissioned officers.<sup>20</sup> Union organization and recruitment in the Bundeswehr was originally authorized in 1958 but, until August 1966, only 2500 soldiers in the 450,000 man force were members.<sup>21</sup> By August 1966, increasing pressure placed upon the West German Defense Minister, Herr Kai-Uwe von Hassel, forced him to allow the O.T.V. to begin recruiting actively in the barracks. Three months later the membership had grown to 3500 professionals with the expectation that 15,000 members could be recruited by 1968.<sup>22</sup>

The O.T.V. has made a strong point of limiting its activities to social, economic, and professional interests of the serviceman. No effort has been made to enter into any military decisions or to give unsolicited advice.<sup>23</sup> Although some officers do belong to the union, it is strongly held by many Generals that membership in a union is not compatible with obedience to commands nor with military discipline.<sup>24</sup> This feeling is not greatly surprising, since many of the Bundeswehr Generals were members of the pre-1945 army that traditionally viewed labor unions with considerable disfavor.

### Development of the Bundeswehr

At the end of the Second World War in 1945, Germany had not only been defeated and had surrendered, but the country had been stripped of its armed forces, disarmed, and occupied. The immediate reaction of the conquering powers in the postwar years was that Germany would never be permitted to bear arms or to threaten her neighbors' borders again. This feeling remained strong among the allies. Thus, when the constitution of the Federal Republic was drafted in 1949, West Germany was specifically denied a defense function.<sup>25</sup>

During the subsequent years, the U.S.S.R. and the Western nations drifted further apart and the Cold War became firmly entrenched. Communist aggression in Korea spurred the acceptance within the West that the rearmament of Germany would have to be accomplished on a limited scale to aid in her own defense, especially since the United States was becoming deeply embroiled in the Korean Conflict and was unable to commit extensive resources to Europe's security defenses.

Thus, a dilemma had developed in which Germany's defense could not forever be supported by the West but in which it was not felt desirable to totally rearm her. The solution to the dilemma was finally negotiated in Paris and London in 1954 when Germany was invited into the NATO alliance.<sup>26</sup>

Upon the acceptance of Germany into NATO, the Bonn Constitution was amended in March 1954 to permit the re-establishment of armed forces and the re-introduction



of compulsory military service. When it had become clear that a defense system would again be established, politicians of all parties were determined that no rebirth of militarism would take place.<sup>27</sup>

#### Civilianization of the Force

The fear that prevailed during the initial organization of the Bundeswehr was that the army might be allowed to become politically powerful again, as it had been in the past. This fear is still prevalent in German politics, even today. A quotation from the Political Studies clearly portrays this apprehension:

Mirabeau had coined the phrase that Prussia was not a country with an army but an army with a country, and this description remained to some extent true of the German Empire. In the Weimar Republic, on the other hand, the army tended to become a state within a state, neither master nor subordinate of the legitimate authority of the state but a rival to it. The politicians of the Bonn Republic were determined to assure the "primacy of the political."<sup>28</sup>

Therefore, the mold was cast. The armed forces were placed firmly in the hands of the government. Military policy was to reflect political aims determined by the government, not the military as had been the case in the past days of the Wehrmacht. For these reasons, every effort and action was directed toward civilianization of the force.

By 1955 the Defense Ministry was created, and the first 1500 volunteers were recruited early in 1956. The formation of the new Bundeswehr was proceeding

rapidly with the first draftees being called to duty in April 1957, and with 100,000 men under arms by July.<sup>29</sup> Growth continued until a force of 430,000 men was attained in 1963. The tracing of further growth to 450,000 men is not so important as is the philosophy with which this military force was treated.

In "West German Foreign and Defense Policy," an article by Elmer Plischke, are listed ten main policies the Federal Republic adopted to govern the military. Following are five of the policies from this listing,<sup>30</sup>

Maintain civilian control, i.e., under parliamentary supervision and civilian political leadership.

Keep the military force, as well as its individual members, apolitical, and not allow the military to become a government within a government.

Deem members of the military service to be "citizens in uniform," not comprising an elite class enjoying a special position in the political community, but nevertheless constituting an integral and respected element of the social order.

Create a new "inner structure," i.e., a reformed relationship between officers and men, founded on inherent principles of a democratic society.

Avoid the spirit of militarism.

An examination of the list indicates how very intent was the government in preventing a state within a state to evolve once again.

The creation of a philosophy of "citizens in uniform" was an important step toward humanizing the

soldiers and making them feel they are still part of a democratic society. The philosophy encouraged the recognition by the soldiers that they are not elite supermen but rather ordinary citizens fulfilling one of the finest tasks possible in serving their nation. The deep-seated desire for the social order of a democratic society, for the protection of the individual's rights, and for recognition of the soldier as an accepted part of the society, are important factors that have led to the civilianization of the military personnel and the unionization of the Bundeswehr.

#### Leadership Training

"Innure Fuehrung" or "Inner Structure" is a difficult to translate concept that is taught to the officers and non-commissioned officers at a special army school at Koblenz. The concept envisions a regimen of leaderships and character training based mainly on self-discipline.<sup>31</sup> In an effort to assure a better leader-soldier relationship whereby the soldier will understand the reason behind orders, it allows him to have a questioning mind and to not fall in line or obey with blind obedience. Although this philosophy is another step toward humanizing the military, it is not viewed with favor by all military leaders -- as is evidenced in statements by several generals who feel the philosophy has created problems in maintaining discipline and has "produced an unsoldierly army."<sup>32</sup>

#### The Ombudsman

To further secure the soldier's democratic rights and to provide him with protection against injustices,

he is represented by an Ombudsman appointed by the Parliament.<sup>33</sup> The function of the Ombudsman, or Parliamentary Commissioner whose appointment was provided for in a 1956 amendment to the Bonn Constitution, is:<sup>34</sup>

... to protect the "citizen in uniform" and to act as the eyes and ears of Parliament. He was not merely to be a "complaints man," but he was also to watch the developments in the armed forces and to inform Parliament in good time if any undemocratic tendencies appeared. While at first the former aspect of his work appeared to predominate, in recent years importance has been attached to his more general duty of reporting on the state of the armed forces. Paradoxically it has been a need for greater discipline rather than the feared revival of militarism that he has discovered.<sup>35</sup>

Therefore, from the inception of the Bundeswehr, an open channel of communication directly upward has been established.

With this great emphasis placed upon individual rights and democratic activities, it is little surprise that the Bonn Government allowed active unionization efforts to begin in August 1966.

#### The O.I.V. in the Bundeswehr

Union recruitment in the barracks was not greeted with open arms by the German high command. When open membership canvassing was first allowed in 1966, two general officers resigned in protest from the Bundeswehr.<sup>36</sup> The significance of their action can be more

fully appreciated when it is considered that one of the resigning generals was the Inspector-General, the senior military commander of the Bundeswehr, and the second general was the commander of the army's Third Military District. The union therefore regarded the acceptance of the resignations as, "a mandate for broad organization of military personnel."<sup>37</sup>

Although the O.T.V. is optimistic about its acceptance in the future, continuing resistance against unionization efforts in the military is quite evident.

Even after the defeat of World War II, German officers retained their antilabor sentiment, labeled union organizing efforts "contradictory to the principle of command and obedience."<sup>38</sup>

This antiunion sentiment is still common among career military personnel. For instance, an interview with one German Air Force officer revealed the opinion that officers who join the union are looked down upon by their peers and their action is definitely "not the thing to do."<sup>39</sup> Nevertheless, Time magazine reported, in November 1966, that four general officers were dues-paying members of the soldiers union.<sup>40</sup>

Although the road toward unionization has been a long one within the German Bundeswehr, the Public Services, Transport and Traffic Workers Union (Soldiers Section) is still engaged in an active recruitment and growth campaign.

#### Functions of the O.T.V.

The O.T.V. is pledged to represent the soldier in a socio-political vein and to create a better under-

standing of what the new military force really is; in short, the O.T.V. seeks to create an acceptable image of the new citizen in uniform and to dispel the distrust the German people hold toward the military. The O.T.V. is directing its efforts toward having the Bundeswehr become an accepted part of the community instead of a social isolate.

In 1970 the president of O.T.V., Heinz Kluncker, spoke on the subject of "Armed Might and Organized Labor" in Mosbach/Baden, Germany.<sup>41</sup> At that time, he reaffirmed the role of the union and the problems it faces. He also defined the framework within which the union works:

The Public Services, Transportation and Communications Trade's Union has knowingly limited itself in its union activity, to representing the social, economic, and professional interests of the servicemen and civilian employees of the West German Army.<sup>42</sup>

Herr Kluncker further defined the limitations on the union, as follows:

We have no desire to mix into the activities of the service and certainly do not wish to give any unrequested advise on military problems. We shall maintain this same stand in the future.<sup>43</sup>

In 1966 an O.T.V. union leader outlined what the union would do for the soldier.<sup>44</sup> Better pay was the first item, and easier promotion was the second point. Although exactly what was meant by the word "easier," promotions are necessary in any army especially to retain good young men -- and Germany is faced with a



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major retention problem.<sup>45</sup> Also described as goals of the O.T.V. are obtaining increased recreational facilities at the bases, increased health coverage for the soldiers, and a pension plan equivalent to that of civil servants -- certainly valid points that any union would seek for its members.

To further enhance coordination between the O.T.V. and the Defense Minister, in June 1970 the union proposed an integrated Socio-Political Department be established in the Ministry of Defense. The department would be equally active for military and civilian personnel and would aid both the O.T.V. and the Defense Ministry in solving important socio-political problems relating to the Bundeswehr. The department would be primarily concerned with problems associated with professional and technical training, salaries, housing and family care, as well as with social considerations relating to leisure hours, social clubs and canteens.<sup>46</sup>

#### Limitations on the O.T.V.

The most important limitation that is placed upon any military union is the right to strike. Within the Federal Republic of Germany, civil servants' unions are forbidden by law to strike and no problem is, therefore, foreseen by the Bundeswehr in that regard.

The other previously-mentioned limitations described by the president of the O.T.V. appear to be logical and reasonable. Indeed, the union has no

desire to interfere with military orders,<sup>47</sup> since such actions would only overlap the restrictions imposed by the Soldiers' Law of 1956 which outlines the limits an officer must stay within in issuing orders.<sup>48</sup> Neither will the union enter into grievances concerning duty assignments or interfere with disciplinary actions, as these are also adequately covered by law.<sup>49</sup>

Thus, the O.T.V. is primarily dedicated to its socio-political responsibilities of protecting the soldier, improving his life, and winning greater acceptance for him in the civilian world with his new-found status as a "citizen in uniform."

### Summary

The organization and development of a military force in Germany after the Second World War has been slow and deliberate. Previous mistakes in failing to control the military establishment were not to be allowed to recur, simply because the public was quite fearful of the strength and power that had been unwisely vested in the pre-war military. As a result, the post-war Bundeswehr was established under the very closest of civilian controls, and it will undoubtedly remain so in the foreseeable future. Indeed, the present military is still not widely socially acceptable.

This inherent fear of the power and strength of the military has led to actions intended to "civilianize" the force and to ultimately accept the soldier as a part of the democratic society. With the changing social feeling toward the military, organized labor and

the armed forces are beginning to become an integral part of German society -- although resistance is still quite evident. Traditional reservations still exist in that unions are distrusted by the military and the power of the military is feared by the unions. Mutual trust can only be achieved over time as old reservations gradually disappear.

Within the Bundeswehr, the O.T.V. has not proven to be a panacea in resolving the socio-political problems of the serviceman. With both the union and the Ombudsman representing the soldier in overlapping areas affecting his welfare, it appears that neither organization is doing all that is desired. Low pay, low morale, poor retention rates, unattractiveness of a military career, undermanning of the forces, and questionable acceptance of the new Bundeswehr by society -- all raise questions about the effectiveness of the union in meeting the needs of the soldier. The union certainly has not accomplished its avowed goals as yet. Indeed, it may never be able to do so in a military organization that distrusts unions and in a society that fears the military.

#### **IV. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES**

The benefits and gains or the detriments and handicaps of a military union, to either members or managers, are so interrelated that it is virtually impossible to express a single point as either all good for one individual and all bad for another. There is no real separation between a union member and a military manager per se, since one individual may fill both roles at the same time. As a result, no dichotomy exists and a union for the military will always have advantages and disadvantages depending upon which situation an individual is in at a particular point in time. Thus, to please everyone is to please no one.

##### **Advantages in General**

A union may offer certain advantages to its members in attaining increased wages, benefits, and prestige.

##### **Wages**

The attainment of increased pay and wages or the achievement of salary equality has historically been a strong reason for the acceptance of unionization. One of the major factors in the growth of employee associations and unions among civil service personnel has been the dissimilarity of pay scales between private sector employees and public employees. Although

government employees generally enjoy greater job security than do their counterparts in the private domain, security is not all to which man aspires. Additional funds generally increase a man's ability to seek higher plateaus in his hierarchy of needs.<sup>50</sup>

With industrial salaries climbing steadily higher, concerted efforts of a strong union have been able to gain equitable monetary benefits for public sector employees. In Norway, for instance, the effectiveness of a union bargaining for wages is the accepted way for the military to obtain increases. Collective bargaining in Germany is also effective, but less so than in Norway. Nevertheless, since union bargaining for wages in these two countries is apparently working rather effectively, there is nothing to indicate that collective bargaining would not also be effective within the United States military establishment.

#### Benefits

Other benefits that are tied indirectly to wages are pension plans, insurance and disability compensation.

Pension plans.--The thought of a contributory pension program has been approached in the Hubbell Pay Plan proposal. The present military retirement system has been attacked as archaic and expensive to the nation. Plans for change have been proposed, but none have been settled upon as yet. Could a union not represent the needs of the military in developing a pension plan that could satisfy all parties concerned? The

Norwegian Defense Forces have a pension plan that is monitored by the B.F.O. and negotiated with the government. Union success in this area is quite apparent. The desire for a pension plan for the German military personnel that was equivalent to the civil servants' plan was a major point stressed during the 1966 unionization of the Bundeswehr.

Insurance and disability compensation.--Government life insurance is provided at a rate less than any individual can obtain in the private market. Disability compensation of a form is also provided for those injured on active duty. Benefits are also gained upon retirement. Despite these favorable coverages, a union may very well be able to negotiate for increased amounts of low rate insurance and higher percentages of disability declared to individuals who have suffered injury before retirement, since unions in the private sector have experienced great success in gaining important fringe benefits in these areas.

#### Prestige

An effective military union can provide a great service in increasing the status or prestige of a military career in the eyes of the general public. Some may refer to this type of activity as "P. R." (public relations) work and castigate the necessity of educating the private citizen. However, the Norwegian B.F.O. recognized this important requirement from its very inception, as is evidenced by one of its stated objectives of "working for an understanding of Defense Forces among



the Norwegian people."<sup>51</sup> The German O.T.V. also has a very large public relations mission in educating the citizenry. The Bundeswehr is currently suffering from an inability to attract enough officers and NCO's to the service. Presently, there is a shortage of 12,000 officers,<sup>52</sup> and the prestige of the soldier is extremely low with many youths not desiring to pursue a military career.<sup>53</sup> Thus, raising the status of the German soldier is a goal to which Heinz Kluncker, as the president of O.T.V., has committed his union.

The United States armed forces are also suffering the consequences of a "low-status syndrome." Less than desirable retention rates, disengagement from Southeast Asia without a clear military victory, an increasingly serious drug abuse problem within the services, and constant pressure from the legislative branch of government to reduce the defense budget, are recognized as either symptoms or causes of a lowered military status. With the avowed desirability of attaining an all-volunteer force, occupational prestige is an absolutely essential prerequisite to attracting young men into the military services.

In discussing the degree of social approval necessary to compensate a soldier for the deprivation, risks, and sacrifices he endures, Colonel Samuel Hays stated the following about recognition by the public:

While this recognition can be expressed to some degree in terms of pay, housing and fringe benefits, it is more importantly a function of prestige, status and public recognition. The motivation and morale of our forces is not a constant which can be taken

for granted as it stems from individual and group needs over time and under varying conditions. In many ways it is easier to procure and develop the technical equipment used by the forces than it is to procure the men needed to put it into battle.<sup>54</sup>

Consequently, a viable public relations and educational program supervised by a strong union could aid in lifting the social status and prestige of a military career.

So much for the discussion of certain general advantages that might accrue from the organization of a union within the military establishment. A transition to specifics will now be made. In the following sections, a general discourse on the topic or subject will be presented, and it will be viewed as applicable to the manager and the member alike.

### Grievances

A grievance has been defined as, "An actual or supposed circumstance regarded as just cause for protest. A complaint or protestation based on such a circumstance."<sup>55</sup> Certainly, from this definition it is obvious that grievances and the circumstances giving rise to them have existed in military forces for centuries. It is a rare individual that cannot remember a time when he had what he considered a justifiable grievance but had no means of seeking redress. Thus, a union can perform a vital function in establishing a grievance process for its members to use in seeking

an audience for their complaints and remedies to their problems.

### The Manager

The military manager of today is far different from his counterpart of only two decades ago. He is more sophisticated in his approach to problems and has a broader base of knowledge to support his analyses for decision-making. The advent of computers, operations research, systems analysis, and an increased emphasis on human relations in management training, have all increased the number of ways of identifying and resolving problems.

Advantages.--To resolve problems requires a means of feedback, such as occurs when a radio station monitors its own broadcasts for positive control. This feedback can provide clues as to where a problem exists or may develop if corrective action is not taken. The grievance process can serve as this important feedback loop for the manager. In examining a grievance with a trained union representative, it may be possible to get to the real root of a problem and apply corrective action. Since survivability of the organization is a prime objective of a manager, early identification of problem areas works to his advantage.

Good working relations between managers and unions not only helps resolve grievances but may often prevent them from occurring. Such has been found to be the case in the private sector of the economy. In their textbook on personnel management, Strauss and Sayles have pointed

out that management has learned that job and working conditions may be changed much more readily, with fewer complaints, if the union is consulted beforehand and acts to smooth the way by clearing up potential trouble areas in advance.<sup>56</sup> Military unions could be equally as effective as industrial unions in this regard. Even though union participation in strictly military decisions could not be condoned, union counsel could be accepted and even welcomed in non-military matters. For instance, German trade unions collaborate with industrial leaders through a philosophy of "co-determination," or join management where labor consultation is reinforced by labor participation in top management.<sup>57</sup>

Disadvantages.--Some managers may feel ill at ease with another organization watching their activities. The mere fact that another agency must be dealt with is an administrative burden. Additional paperwork, use of a clerical staff that may already be less than adequate, and the additional time that must be taken from a busy day, all appear as possible detriments or disadvantages to the manager. Furthermore, the possibility that bureaucratic red tape could develop beyond workable bounds, if allowed to grow unchecked, could prove another hindrance. However, proper planning, organizing, and controlling can prevent these possible disadvantages from interfering with any grievance procedure.

Finally, publicity by the union of unsettled grievances could easily be used as pressure for reform, and in so doing would certainly create an uncomfortable

situation for the inefficient manager who failed to address legitimate grievances and thereby permitted such an adverse situation to develop.

#### The Union Member

Again, it is difficult to separate a union member from a military manager, since they can be one and the same person.

Advantages.--Identifying injustices and solving them "in-house" can reap benefits for both the member of the union as well as the military manager. Advantages accrue to the manager because small irritants can often be resolved before they grow into large problems involving many others. The member benefits because unfair practices or treatment can be brought to the attention of an interested party who can apply pressure for change when it is warranted.

Thus, placing a grievance with a union representative may not only get rapid results, but it could settle the problem at the local level without involving other echelons of command unless it becomes absolutely necessary. The time-honored privilege of a serviceman to visit the Inspector General or to write a letter to his Congressman will normally achieve results, but such action arouses inquiries at far higher levels than required had it been possible to file a grievance with an interested party at the base or operational level. In Norway, for instance, the first attempt at correcting the grievance will be at the local level and, if satisfactory resolution is not attained, the grievance moves

progressively up the chain to the national headquarters of the B.F.O. for eventual settlement. The German O.T.V. operates similarly in that grievances may progress all the way up the hierarchial chain to the parliament, if required.

Disadvantages.--On the other hand, once a complaint is filed with a union, that act in itself can have detrimental consequences to the individual. Military services traditionally have many ways to make life rather unpleasant for those who may be identified as complainers or problem makers. Fear of these consequences, alone, may prevent some complaints from ever being submitted. And acceptance within a group may be withheld from a complainant, if the group feels the grievance was not justified. The social isolation which could result would likely further increase the unhappiness and dissatisfaction of the complaining member of the union.

### Communication

Communication is indispensable to any organization. Few activities within the world can successfully continue without it. Communication refers to the transmission or exchange of thoughts, messages or actions by any available means through a connective system of routes and channels. Without communication, effective management could not exist. Planning, organizing, and controlling the functions and activities of the organization would be impossible. Consequently, communication can be considered the keystone of management and, thus, of organization.

Although many barriers to communication can be cited,<sup>58</sup> several are more prevalent or of more consequence within the military setting. The size of an organization is a barrier to effective communication, as are too many echelons or levels of management. A very real obstruction is fear or prejudice within an individual, as is the failure of individuals to understand the real interests of those whom they supervise. A military union may prove quite helpful in diluting or lessening the impact of these barriers to communication.

### The Manager

Advantages.--One of the greatest advantages a union offers to the manager is that it may serve as a single point of contact for managerial communication. If a manager had to deal directly with all individual members having grievances, he would soon be inundated with a multitude of problems. Thus, communication with a single union representative can prove most helpful to the manager, since a large group of people and a diverse number of problems may be addressed through a central focal point.

A union can effectively relieve the barrier of communications overload for the manager. The large size of the military organization dictates that much management must be done by the "exception principle." Very simply stated, this principle means that exceptions to the normal require the attention of management; otherwise, everything else is considered to be within tolerance and requires little or no attention on the part of



the manager. If management was not accomplished in this fashion, communication channels would become so overloaded that it would be virtually impossible for an individual to assimilate and sort through all the data required to identify the valid problems that really need the attention of management. The union could very well serve management in collating and consolidating problems for presentation to management when action seems warranted, thereby serving to help keep channels of communications open and not overloaded.

Disadvantages.--Regardless of these advantages just discussed, a union represents still another entity with which management must deal. For example, a general feeling gathered from interviews conducted with five field grade officers, all of whom have had managerial assignments, could be expressed as, "That's all I need -- someone else to assist me. There are already enough problems without a union." This typical reaction seems to closely parallel inferences obtained from a review of the literature relating to German unionization. On the other hand, the Norwegian union seems to be better accepted among the military. This seems plausible, since the Norwegian Defense Force actively sought union representation after the enactment of the Official Service Agreement in 1958.

#### The Union Member

Advantages.--The problem of upward communication is often approached by a young soldier with a certain amount of fear or apprehension, simply because relaying

a grievance in a strange environment is usually an awesome experience in itself. A young man often has difficulty in being able to relate to a senior non-commissioned officer, who is often the senior supervisor and insulator for the officer-in-charge. For example, the soldier may approach his superior with what is to him a very real problem. However, the superior, drawing upon his wealth of experience, is readily able to determine that the soldier does not, in fact, have any problem at all -- and the superior tells the soldier so. Unfortunately, the older supervisor may not be able to relate to or empathize with the young soldier either, and the natural consequence of this lack of empathy and communication between the two individuals is that the young man goes away still believing he has a real problem which no one is interested in helping him to resolve.

In the foregoing case, a union grievance representative could have served a vital role in helping the soldier determine whether he had a problem or not. If the problem was found valid, a grievance could be filed with management. If it was not valid, the union representative could explain why it was considered so and the soldier's problem would often cease to exist. Indeed, if his complaint was ruled to be invalid, the soldier would likely be satisfied with the union's actions since he had been afforded the opportunity for a hearing of his complaint before an interested party.

Disadvantages.--One concern indirectly tied to communication is the effect of union membership on an individual's social status. A person who has formerly

enjoyed accepted status within a group may have it withdrawn once he becomes a union member, especially in the earlier stages of unionization when relatively few members of the organization have joined the union. This also may be more true of an officer who becomes a union member than of an enlisted man. For example, one German officer stated that joining a union as an officer is definitely frowned upon as being "just not the thing to do."

### Discipline

The subject of discipline has been widely addressed by many military writers of the day. For better or worse, easing of discipline within the ranks has occurred -- even though the wisdom of such action has been seriously questioned by many authorities. Regardless of what is happening in this area, a strong union could effectively aid a manager in enforcing discipline among the members of the union and the organization.

To understand how the union might help the manager, the context in which "union" is used must first be made clear. The rampant banding together of discontented soldiers as has happened at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and other military posts -- in making radical demands and labelling themselves a "soldiers' union" -- is not the context in which "union" is used. Rather, a legally accepted and established organization is the interpretation used in this discussion. Within that framework, it is important to recognize that organized discipline is a key objective of labor unions in general, which are

concerned with the enforcement of contracts, the conduct of its members, and the control of the labor force to meet the standards expected by industry. With regard to military unions, one authority on the subject<sup>59</sup> feels that a strong union can, indeed, demand support from and impose discipline upon its members -- unlike the present military associations that do not require active military support. Since a strong union is as much concerned with discipline as is a military organization, it may be possible that the two organizations would not work at cross purposes to each other. In fact, this study has found no evidence that a military union has undermined discipline in either the Norwegian or German military forces. Thus, it would appear that a military union, kept within reasonable bounds, would not necessarily interfere with military discipline and might, indeed, reinforce it.

### Summary

It has been seen that Norwegian and German unions have effectively bargained for wages as well as for other benefits of insurance, disability payments, and pension plans. In the United States, however, action on these items has historically been within the province of Congress. Foreign unions are involved in raising the prestige of the military establishment and its personnel in their respective countries, while little is being done in the United States at this time to correct a growing problem in this particular area.

Within this section of the study, operation of the grievance process with its consequent advantages and

disadvantages to both managers and union members has been presented, as have communication processes, the removal of barriers to communications, and a short discussion on discipline. Thus, this section has addressed Research Questions One and Two which were concerned with the advantages and disadvantages of a military union to its members and to the military manager, respectively.

## V. LIMITATIONS

In our contemporary society, no organization may be allowed unbounded operation without adverse consequences. Constraints on the actions of some are necessary to preserve the rights of others within the society. Thus, limitations on the scope and power of a military union should certainly be well conceived and written into law before the establishment of the union is accepted or sanctioned.

### Review of German and Norwegian Limitations

Both Germany and Norway very specifically withhold the power of strike from unions that operate in the public sector. The right of civil servants to strike is prohibited by law.

Neither union, the B.F.O. nor the O.T.V., is permitted to interfere with the operation of military law. Norwegian military law is well established, with no conflict between it and union representation. Germany has protected the rights of the soldier with the Soldiers' Law of 1956 and the Military Criminal Code of 1957. In both instances the unions have no intervention authority.

A third limitation on the unions is that they exercise no control over their military members in combat operations or in periods of national emergencies. The rationale for such constraints is that national security is paramount and no restrictions can be imposed on the military activities of the defense forces of the nation.

Neither union will impede the accomplishment of the military mission. No attempt to intervene in discipline or to place restrictions upon the military that could curtail the effectiveness of the force is attempted.

In essence, then, the activities of both unions are limited to bargaining for social and economic benefits for their military members.

#### Limitations for a U.S. Military Union

##### Strikes

If the role of the military is to provide constant and continuing national security, the right for military union members to strike cannot be condoned. Strikes, or even boycotts, could not be allowed to take place on either a limited or an unlimited scale. For example, even the employee unions in the public sector are not yet allowed to strike, although this injunction has often been ignored.

For instance, in March of 1970, the postal workers in the United States violated the federal law by going on strike. The strike was conducted nationwide. By this complete withdrawal of postal services, the postmen effectively forced a cabinet-level officer to sit down at the bargaining table with the union to discuss the non-negotiable item of wages.<sup>60</sup> The strike was eventually settled and the mail carriers returned to duty. Without an organized union, this blatant disregard of federal law may never have taken place.



In January 1971, policemen in New York City went on a six-day strike, although it has sometimes been referred to as a boycott or work-slowdown. A skeleton force of police did remain on duty to respond to emergencies. This boycott had taken place within a group that was not allowed to "strike." Again, union organization had been able to form a cohesive force for strike activities.

Writing in the Monthly Labor Review, E. Wight Bakke, Sterling Professor of Economics at Yale University, made eight predictions concerning bargaining in the public sector. First among these predictions was that, "unionization in the public sector will increase rapidly and extensively."<sup>61</sup> His second prediction was that, "unionism in the public sector in the foreseeable future is going to be militant, . . ." after which he stated his reasons for the prediction.<sup>62</sup> Professor Bakke made a further point regarding strikes and the public sector employee by saying:

The use of the strike by public servants is not going to be legitimized, but the strike or some other form of reduction or withdrawal of services having the same impact is going to be used extensively nevertheless.<sup>63</sup>

He concluded that:

The record of successes by public employees who have resorted to strikes encourages confidence that, notwithstanding its illegality, it is a method that gets results.<sup>64</sup>

Professor Bakke's remarks further illustrate the newfound power of public sector employees in the use and application of the strike. The fact that strikes are prohibited by law has virtually no meaning.

From the preceding illustrations, it is evident that a military union should not only be prevented from striking but that some extraordinarily firm controls would have to be devised to insure that no illegal strike by the military could take place.

### Peacetime Representation

A limitation as to when union representation ceases should be explicit -- but, of course, therein lies the difficulty.

Military unions should exercise no control over members during war, combat support operations, or national emergencies. Commanders and managers must be permitted to operate with free rein and no incumbrances other than those imposed by national objectives.

Careful writing of a union charter would be requisite, for what if there were to occur a police action as there was in Korea or an undeclared war as in Vietnam? A state of war declared by Congress such as occurred in the First and Second World Wars is certain and unmistakable, but support of a combat operation such as has occurred in Korea and Vietnam is less clearly defined. Where would the union powers be curtailed?

If a union is prohibited from taking any actions hampering support of combat, the determination of where to establish the limit is the problem. Certainly the direct loading and shipping of war supplies from ports of embarkation clearly qualify as support activities. But what of overtime maintenance of an aircraft that might only be used to airlift supplies, or the servicing

of a warehouse that contains supplies that will be shipped to the combat zone at some later time? And what of the office clerk who works overtime on reports and orders during protracted conflicts; is he supporting the operation?

To limit a union's influence over such operations is a very complex problem. Possible only the commanders and managers of military operations can determine what should properly be called support and what should not. Perhaps anytime that the United States military forces are engaged in or even moving toward armed conflict, the union must be required to cease all activities until a return to peace or a state of normalcy occurs.

#### Political Neutrality

As a professional army is apolitical, so should be the union that represents its members. The United States military establishment has always been subordinate to civilian control, as it should forever continue to be. The development of a "state within a state" should never be permitted to occur. A military force represents its nation and enforces foreign policy, regardless of which may be the political party in power. As a consequence, a military union must also always be without politics. For a military union to declare support for one party or another, to throw its power, money, and influence behind a particular political party or philosophy, would be the first step toward establishing a government controlled by the military. Although the occurrence of such an event is extremely unlikely, it must nevertheless be carefully guarded against since it would totally violate the democratic traditions upon which our republic is based.

### Social Benefits

No doubt exists as to the effectiveness of a union in bargaining for social benefits, wages, promotions, insurance, fringe benefits, and possibly social status -- as many private industries can testify. In these areas of socio-economic concern, a union for the military man could also equally excel. By strictly limiting a military union's activities to bargaining only in these areas, many problems relating to intervention or interference with the military managers' role would be automatically circumvented.

### Noninterference

Noninterference applies to the limiting of any intervention with military decisions and the furnishing of any unsolicited advice. A union, acting as counsel for the military manager in the identification, solution, and possible prevention of problems, could well fill a meaningful role. Beyond this, the union should be restrained from any entry into or interference with the military decision process.

### Summary

A capsule review of five basic limitations on Norwegian and German military unions indicated that the same general constraints should be considered from an American viewpoint.

The limitation upon the right to strike is the most critical restraint. With trends toward growing militancy

in public unions, it is not difficult to comprehend the consequences of a strike by our armed forces, should that occasion ever arise.

Perhaps the most feasible approach to this problem would be to establish a very rigid framework within which a union must operate rather than formulating specific limitations for its general activities. Such would be the argument for defining a framework within which a union would operate strictly in the area of social benefits for its members.

Although the limitation on the right to strike must be clearly defined, the other four limitations may not be as important if a union is allowed only to operate in the area of collective bargaining for wages and associated social benefits.

This section of the research study has addressed Research Question Three, which was concerned with what limitations should be imposed upon a military union.

## VI. CONCLUSION

This research study has revealed that a union for military personnel can effectively operate within a military environment.

### Findings

In a historically highly unionized nation such as Norway, union representation has found an accepted place within their society. This social acceptance is clearly indicated by the existence of two basic federations in that nation -- one that represents employees and the other that represents employers. Consequently, the recognized need for a group to represent the military personnel within the Norwegian Defense Force was not out of character for their society, rather it was a logical reflection of the basic values and beliefs of the nation as a whole.

Without a union, the Norwegian military personnel lacked the ability to communicate with the government on problems concerning social needs, wages, and working conditions. Therefore a military union was established to bring together the previously diverse officers' societies into one single cohesive representative body. Thus, the union found a definite and well accepted place within the Norwegian military and governmental structure.

The development of a German union to represent the military forces within that country occurred under far

different circumstances. The country had been greatly transformed after total defeat in World War II. German society emerged from the war with a deep distaste for the military in general, a feeling that stemmed not only from their crushing defeat but from the fear of military power engendered during the years of Hitler's regime and even the previous era of the Weimar Republic and the Wehrmacht. Thus, when the new Federal Republic of Germany was accepted into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and was required to rebuild a military force, the foremost concern of many Germans was that the military would not be allowed to ever again gain a position of political strength. Such were the fears that prompted the complete subordination of the Bundeswehr to civilian control.

With the actions to "civilianize" the force -- to treat the soldier not as a social outcast but as an accepted part of society -- unionization of the Bundeswehr was inevitable. For the soldier to be truly accepted as a member of society, all the trappings of society had to be provided to him -- including the right to be represented. Unfortunately, available evidence indicates that the German military union has been unable to solve many of the problems and social ills that exist within the Bundeswehr today. Compared to the success achieved by the Norwegian union, military unionization in Germany has a considerable distance to go before it can be considered anywhere as nearly as successful as has been the case in Norway.



## Conclusions

Unionization within the United States armed forces does not fit into either of the two previously described molds. The development of American unions and military forces bears little resemblance to that of Norway or Germany. Unions in the United States, in both the private and public sectors, lean more toward the use of strikes and work stoppages than do their European counterparts. The growing trend toward militancy in both sectors of American unions is counter to the peaceful coexistence of Norwegian unions and the practice of "codetermination" by German unions. Although the purposes of the union organizations within these three countries are essentially the same, the methods of achieving their goals are quite different between the American and European unions.

While the Norwegian Defense Force is committed to the defense of the homeland and the German Bundeswehr is a NATO defense force by design, the United States military services may also be considered a defense force -- but not in the same connotation as the others. The American forces may be considered defensive in nature, but on a global scale requiring massive power and complete mobility. Therefore, the military requirements of the United States vastly differ from those of the European nations. So, too, are there differences in requirements for a military union.

In particular, the avenues followed by military personnel in seeking redress of their grievances are quite different between the armed forces of these

countries. In the German military establishment, both the union and the Ombudsman are able to help individuals with their problems, although neither the German grievance process nor the Ombudsman procedures have been particularly successful thus far. Indeed, the German experience with military unionization provides little improvement over the existing United States system where the serviceman has the right to communicate with the Inspector General and to enlist the support of his Congressman in seeking solutions to his problem.

Since Congress is specifically charged with the responsibility of raising and supporting the armed forces of the United States, that body also has the responsibility for the care and welfare of the members of these armed forces. Thus, over a period of nearly two hundred years, a paternalistic system has developed within which the members of the military services have enjoyed a direct Congressional interest in their total welfare. The United States Government has historically provided for wages, housing, and rules for treatment of the members of the armed forces, and has taken an interest in the social welfare of the servicemen. Indeed, "champions for the military" have long existed for the American fighting man, serving a role now performed by military unions in Norway and Germany which provides a designated channel of communication between the members of the military forces and their respective national governments. So long as this paternalistic support of the United States armed forces continues to exist, it is difficult to see how a military union could improve upon the benefits provided to the members of the military establishment.

Furthermore, with Congressional control over the armed forces and with the increasing trend toward militancy within public unions, it is unlikely that Congress would relinquish control over the armed forces to a union that could possibly become strong enough to force a strike by the servicemen it would represent. Although such a probability seems very remote at the present time, changes in time and circumstances may definitely increase that possibility in the future.

In the final analysis, considering the present differences in government, society, military needs, and public attitudes within Norway, Germany, and the United States, it is concluded that the existence of a military union in the United States would provide few tangible advantages to either a member or a manager of our military forces within the foreseeable future. So long as the American public fully supports the mission of the military establishment as prescribed by national objectives and so long as the paternalistic system of support for the military services continues to exist in which a number of Congressmen personally dedicate their efforts toward improving the socio-economic welfare of the U.S. servicemen, then there is no need for a military union. If either the public or their elected representatives should ever withhold such support, then the inevitable consequence would be the establishment of a military union within the United States armed forces to represent the rights and welfare of the servicemen in a democratic society.

### Recommendations for Study

In that research traditionally builds upon previous research efforts, one natural consequence of this particular study is the suggestion of other avenues of investigation in the subject of concern. This study was limited in scope in that it sought information relating to two foreign military unions which might be found as applicable to military unionization within our own armed forces.

Other foreign military unions other than those in Norway and Germany do exist. Sweden and Austria have military unions which were not investigated by this study. The historical development and effectiveness of the unions within the respective military structures of these two nations would provide more background of information on military unionism.

Futhermore, it is recommended that further research into the current problems of the German Bundeswehr be conducted, with an analysis of the success the O.T.V. is achieving in addressing social problems within the military establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Finally, continued investigation of military associations and attempts at unionization within our own military establishment must be conducted to specifically ascertain what may be the trends toward unionization and what may be the changing needs for the establishment of a military union to represent the interests and welfare of the members of the United States armed forces.

### Reference and Content Footnotes

<sup>1</sup>Selig Perlman (and others), "Labour (Trade) Union," Encyclopaedia Britannica, (1967), XIII, p. 555.

<sup>2</sup>Leonard D. White, "Civil Service," Encyclopaedia Britannica, (1967), V, p. 846.

<sup>3</sup>Robert D. Leiter, Labor Economics and Industrial Relations, (New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1960), p. 212.

<sup>4</sup>Daniel P. Sullivan, "Soldiers in Unions -- Protected First Amendment Right?" Labor Law Journal, 20:581, September, 1969.

<sup>5</sup>The New York Times, August 26, 1966, p. 8, col. 4.

<sup>6</sup>The Times, (London), November 25, 1969, p. 2, col. a.

<sup>7</sup>The Guardian, Wright State University, January 7, 1971, p. 6, col. 1.

<sup>8</sup>R. Christgau, Esquire, 70:41, August, 1968.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid.

<sup>12</sup>The definition of a labor union that was addressed in this study has been: "an association of military persons, officer and enlisted, organized for the purpose of collective bargaining about their conditions of employment, wages, and benefits." This broad definition precludes the consideration of smaller trade unions within the military, but provides the concept of one large organization to represent the combined military force.

<sup>13</sup>The definition of a manager that was used for the second research question is: "any officer or non-commissioned officer that is charged with the responsibility to supervise others, in the fulfillment of a continuing task, e.g., an office manager or squadron commander." A supervisor of a cleanup detail would not be considered a manager in this context.

<sup>14</sup>R. E. Lindgren and P. Boardman, "Norway," Collier's Encyclopedia (1970), XIV, p. 671.

<sup>15</sup>O. F. K., "Norway," Britannica Book of the Year (1970), p. 572.

<sup>16</sup>A. K. Stein, Captain, Royal Norwegian Air Force. From an interview conducted at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, on February 10, 1971.

<sup>17</sup>In the Norwegian Defense Forces, the use of the word "officers" refers to both commissioned and non-commissioned officers.

<sup>18</sup>A. K. Stein (trans.), "B. F. O.'s History," Befalets Organisasjonsforhold, (Oslo: Norsk Prent L.L., 1970), p. 16.

<sup>19</sup>The Norges Befalslag is a minority group and today represents only 4.5 per cent of the non-commissioned officers.

<sup>20</sup>The New York Times, August 26, 1966, p. 8, col. 4.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid.

<sup>22</sup>"I'm All Right, Hans," Time, November 18, 1966, p. 42.

<sup>23</sup>Heinz Kluncker, "Armed Might and Organized Labor," Dr. J. W. Stock (trans.), A speech delivered at Mosbach/Baden, Germany, 1970.

<sup>24</sup>The New York Times, op. cit.

<sup>25</sup>Elmer Plischke, "West German Foreign and Defense Policy," Orbis, 12:1100, Winter, 1969.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., p. 1102.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., p. 1108.

<sup>28</sup>F. Ridley, "Parliamentary Commissioner for Military Affairs," Political Studies, 12:2, 1964.

<sup>29</sup>Plischke, op. cit., p. 1109.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., p. 1110.

<sup>31</sup>"Grumbles, Not Mutiny," The Economist, 224:1084, September 23, 1967.

<sup>32</sup>"The Orphan Army," Time, June 20, 1969, p. 30, col. 2. Also see an article by N. Brown, "Bonn's Angry Brass Hats," New Statesman, 72:344, September 9, 1966.

<sup>33</sup>Norman Crossland, "General Quits Bundeswehr," Manchester Guardian, November 29, 1969, p. 4.

<sup>34</sup>Ridley, op. cit., p. 7.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid., p. 8.

<sup>36</sup>The New York Times, August 26, 1966, p. 8, col. 4.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid.

<sup>38</sup>Time, op. cit., November 18, 1966.

<sup>39</sup>The German officer's name has been withheld at his specific request, since he preferred his remarks to remain anonymous.

<sup>40</sup>Time, op. cit., November 18, 1966.

<sup>41</sup>Kluncker, op. cit.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid.

<sup>44</sup>Time, November 18, 1971, loc. cit.

<sup>45</sup>Time, op. cit., June 20, 1969.

<sup>46</sup>"The Public Services, Transportation and Communications Trades Union Takes Its Position," Dr. J. W. Stock (trans.), From a mimeographed paper from the German Embassy, Washington, D.C., 1970.

<sup>47</sup>"Germany's New Army: No. 1 in Europe Again," U.S. News and World Report, September 12, 1966, p. 70.

<sup>48</sup>Ridley, op. cit., p. 5.

<sup>49</sup>U.S. News and World Report, op. cit.

<sup>50</sup> Abraham Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs is described in almost any basic text in management or personnel psychology. An illustration of the hierarchy is presented by Max D. Richards and Paul S. Greenlaw, Management Decision Making, (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, 1966), p. 104. For a more comprehensive view of the relation between needs and motivation, see Part II, "Needs, Motives, and Goals," in Timothy W. Costello and Sheldon S. Zalkind, Psychology in Administration: A Research Orientation (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), pp. 55-122.

<sup>51</sup> See Section II of this study for a complete description of the functions and objectives of the Norwegian B.F.O.

<sup>52</sup> Jac Weller, "Bundeswehr Organization and Tactics," Military Review, February, 1971, p. 83.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid.

<sup>54</sup> Colonel Samuel H. Hays, "A Military View of Selective Service," The Draft, ed. Sol Tax (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 11.

<sup>55</sup> William Morris (ed.), The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1969).

<sup>56</sup> George Strauss and Leonard Sayles, Personnel: The Human Problems of Management (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967), p. 120.

<sup>57</sup> W. H. McPherson, "Labor Relations in Postwar Germany," University of Illinois Bulletin, June 1957, p. 60.

<sup>58</sup> For example, see William G. Scott, Human Relations in Management (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, 1962), or Keith Davis (ed.), Human Relations at Work (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967). Also, Joseph L. Massie, Essentials of Management (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964), presents a concise discussion of barriers to communication.

<sup>59</sup> Lt. Colonel John B. Camealy, Associate Professor, School of Systems and Logistics, lecture, June 3, 1971, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio.



<sup>60</sup>Colonel J. E. Hearn, "Labor Management Relations in the Air Force," Air University Review, January - February, 1971, p. 27.

<sup>61</sup>E. Wight Bakke, "Reflections on the Future of Bargaining in the Public Sector," Monthly Labor Review, July, 1970, p. 21.

<sup>62</sup>Ibid, p. 22.

<sup>63</sup>Ibid, p. 23.

<sup>64</sup>Ibid.

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